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Abstract 
This Master’s thesis is focused on the topic of Euroscepticism and the different 
forms it can take. More specifically, the author analyses two selected case studies, 
countries which are considered Eurosceptic and having right-wing parties in power. 
Those members of the European Union are Hungary and Poland, with Fidesz and Law 
and Justice as the respective parties in government. The thesis provides a background on 
the study of Euroscepticism as a whole, while including the theoretical framework of the 
modern and post-modern systems, which is used to explain fundamental differences 
between the analyzed case studies and the system they find themselves in. The analysis 
itself is based on empirical observations which are used in order to break down 
Euroscepticism into different types according to the Vasilopoulou typology, which was 
used as the main theoretical framework. Both of the theoretical frameworks are critically 
analyzed during their application to the empirical data. The research shows that the 
frameworks can be used successfully to analyse the subject matter, however there are 
some things which those theories do not capture and that can be improved upon. 
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Introduction 
The European Union today is one of the biggest political and economic leaders, 
being a supranational organization, it has more powers than an international organization, 
and less than a state. Therefore, it is not surprising that such events as the financial and 
economic crisis, the increase in the number of immigrants, socio-political changes in 
neighboring states had a complex impact not only on the EU as a whole but on select 
member states as well. All these factors, along with the tendency to reconsider 
sovereignty and national identity, have given rise to increased skepticism about the EU’s 
future prospects. Therefore, the study of the nature of Euroscepticism, the prerequisites 
for its spread, manifestations and influence acts as a topical research problem. 
Amongst the still ongoing Ukrainian and refugee crises, divisions have formed 
inside the European Union regarding the optimal unified policy decisions to be made in 
response to it. Some members of the union see the response to Russian aggression as a 
harsh and lasting effort, while others are in favor of softer measures, while different 
approaches to solving the refugee crisis exist inside the Union.  
The wave of immigrants that swept the EU, provided to be a real challenge to the 
safety and integrity of the Union, for which security, tolerance and the rule of law are one 
of the most important facets. In these conditions some member states chose the way of 
partial unilateral restoration of control over their national borders, thus endangering the 
fundamental principle of freedom of movement. The first country in a long the list of 
states that have suspended the Schengen agreements due to mass influx of refugees 
became Germany in September 2015, according to the Minister of internal Affairs 
Thomas de Maizière “this step has become necessary” (The Guardian, 2015). Shortly 
later, the German example was followed by Austria, then Slovenia, Hungary, Sweden. 
Poland also showed signs of disagreement with the policy of the EU. 
The research is going to focus on two countries of this group – Poland and 
Hungary. Both are states with right-wing governments in power who share a Eurosceptic 
point of view, but each for their own reasons. The extent to which their actions and 
decisions differ in the realm of being Eurosceptic is the main focus of the research that 
follows. The research question of the thesis is: “How do Hungary and Poland differ in 
their Eurosceptic view of the European Union?” Both of these two countries stated their 
7 
 
discontempt with the EU numerous times, however there are some differences between 
their behaviour and rhetoric and it is important to showcase them. 
This topic was selected as a means to attempt to explain and further investigate 
the divisions in the EU and observe how different states that are opposed to the ways in 
which the EU operates express their discontempt and opposition. It is important to study 
the general political climate in the EU, as it finds itself in not pristine condition. The 
general Eurosceptic sentiment and different kinds of it can help explain what the 
pessimistic nature of Euroscepticism portrays currently. 
The goals needed to reach the research objective include a definition and general 
outline of the term Euroscepticism, how it came to be, how it evolved and what it stands 
for currently, and what research on the topic exists. Next a typology of Euroscepticism 
will be selected, and it will be argued that the selected typology fits the goals of the thesis 
– providing a distinction between different Eurosceptic states. The method that is used to 
reach the goal defined above is Structured and Focused comparison by George and 
Bennett, it considers the intricate details in interactions between different states or the EU 
that are developing or already developed to this day. The method requires selecting a clear 
time frame for successful analysis and that time frame is mainly focused the time when 
both parties gained the majority of seats in the respective parliaments, taking into account 
the 2015 EU refugee crisis that happened after.  
The structure of the thesis is the following: the first chapter will provide an outline 
and discuss the literature on the phenomena of Euroscepticism, with multiple points of 
view on when the term itself became conceptualized. As a subheading to the chapter there 
will be presented a modern vs. post-modern dichotomy which is useful to understand the 
nature of the Eurosceptic behavior currently present in the EU. The second chapter is 
devoted to the showcase of the Euroscepticism typology introduced by Vasilopoulou in 
2009. Three types of Eurosceptics are derived – rejecting, conditional and compromising 
Euroscepticism. The third chapter provides a description of the method used in this thesis 
and its requirements. The fourth and fifth chapters are the empirical chapters, they will 
contain factual outline of Hungarian and Polish stances on the topic of European politics 
while paying attention to the data connected with the theoretical frameworks. The sixth 
chapter is the comparison chapter which includes the examination of the theoretical 
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approaches used in the thesis. The data used in the research will consist of both primary 
and secondary sources, such as transcriptions and translations of speeches made by 
different politicians, voting data and scholarly articles that analyze the current state of 
affairs. The intent is to use data that is representative and valid, however some political 
speeches may have not been translated fully into the languages that the author of this 
thesis knows so that may become a problem, however this obstacle can be overcome by 
using secondary sources. The contribution of the thesis is to find out differences in the 
Eurosceptic positions of the chosen case studies, while employing a critical approach to 
the theoretical frameworks used and analyzing their applicability to the empirical data 
and implications for further research and improvement. Finally, in the conclusion the 
main inference of the thesis is summarized, while pointing out some things that could 
have helped the research but were not possible to achieve and possible future research 
possibilities. 
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1. Development of Euroscepticism 
 Euroscepticism is a concept that defines a skeptical, negative attitude to the 
processes of European integration within the EU. The acceleration of the process of 
European integration caused some actors on the EU stage to become displeased with the 
expansion of the EU. That allowed for a formation of opposition to the current idea of 
integration itself in states that are already a part of the EU. Also, Euroscepticism can be 
understood as the ideological and political trend, and a political movement in modern 
Europe. Its representatives oppose the EU in the form that is imposed by modern theorists 
of the Union. It should be noted that today Euroscepticism can be referred to a wide range 
of meanings – from the rejection of the country’s membership in the EU and negative 
attitudes towards the idea of expanding the Union or the policy of limited participation in 
the European integration processes, for example, limited participation in the Schengen 
agreement or the preservation and restoration of the national currency. 
Eurosceptic sentiment existed from the very beginning of the integration process, 
but the concept of “Euroscepticism” first appeared in the 1970s in the United Kingdom. 
The word itself only appeared in the British press in 1985 (Harmsen and Spiering, 2004). 
These sentiments have gained popularity, as the UK has usually been characterized by 
conservatism and a desire to preserve its uniqueness. The use of the word in the current 
sense, whatever it may be, has become prevalent in the post Maastricht era, as increased 
politization of the ongoing integration processes triggered the opposition to them. The 
treaty meant several important differences on how the integration process would work in 
the future, by establishing the Common Foreign and Security Policy and European 
Economic and Monetary Union. Today, British Eurosceptics are concerned that the EU 
will become a superpower, and the United Kingdom, along with national states as such, 
will lose its sovereignty. The main arguments of the British Eurosceptics related to the 
lack of balance between the tax system and the social policy of the EU, the expansion of 
the powers of the European Commission in the areas of justice and domestic policy, the 
lack of democracy in the EU structures and the currency. These and other reasons were 
culprits to the process of Brexit, which is still ongoing. But not only Great Britain has 
pronounced Eurosceptic behaviour. In Denmark, Euroscepticism preceded the accession 
to the European integration project. 
10 
 
Euroscepticism changed along with the policy of European integration structures: 
if in the first decades of the integration process it was in opposition to market integration 
and was associated with rising inflation and unemployment, a decline in economic 
growth. With the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in Euroscepticism another dimension 
associated with the protection of national community and sovereignty appears. But until 
the early 2000s, Euroscepticism was clearly a marginal phenomenon in the political life 
of the EU. The dominance of the ruling Euro-optimist parties and the peripheral nature of 
the Eurosceptic entities, mainly of an extremist nature, was characteristic of most 
European countries. Cross-national analysis of party positions, conducted by Ray (2007), 
confirmed that Euroscepticism is primarily a peripheral phenomenon focused on 
ideological poles and among opposition parties. The results of the study showed that after 
Maastricht, the decline in public support for the EU did not lead to the adoption of 
Eurosceptic positions by the main ruling parties in Europe. Exceptions to this rule were 
the Northern European states, where the centrist parties were Eurosceptic, as well as the 
United Kingdom and France, where there are differences between the center-right and 
center-left on European integration (Ray, 2007). 
The enlargement of the EU in 2004 stimulated the growth of the popularity of 
Euroscepticism, as evidenced by the rejection by the population and some political forces 
of Denmark, Great Britain, Poland, France and the Netherlands of the draft European 
Constitution of 2004, which resulted in non-adoption of the document which lead to the 
signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007. Subsequently, anti-European parties intensified in 
France, Italy, Spain, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and Belgium. 
It should be noted that not all Eurosceptics oppose the ideas of a United Europe 
and for the country’s exit from the EU. However, many of them believe that European 
integration has gone in the wrong direction – towards establishing a European centralized 
regional hegemon. They oppose this way of development and propose their own version 
of a United Europe – a entity, in which supranational institutions, although they exist, do 
not play a major role in politics, which is given to national parliaments and other domestic 
institutions. In such imaginary Europe there is no harmonization of legislation, European 
institutions take only those powers that are not able to be taken over by the state, and the 
solution of most political problems is transferred to a lower level where that is possible. 
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Euroscepticism has become the ideological basis for a broad pan-European 
political movement, represented by various political parties and organizations. Among 
the most known have been and are: The United Kingdom Independence Party, the British 
Conservative Party, the British National Party, The Movement for France, the National 
Front (France), the Spanish Alternative, the Northern League (Italy), the Swiss People’s 
Party, The Finns Party, formerly known as the True Finns. 
 Crisis processes, which act as nutriment to Euroscepticism, helped establish it as 
a political and ideological movement in a fairly large and heterogeneous group of EU 
member states - both those affected by the current crises - Greece, Spain, Portugal, 
Cyprus, Hungary, Italy, Poland; and those who succeeded to avoid the ramifications in 
comparison to the previously named states – the UK, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and the 
Netherlands. In veil of economic, refugee and Ukraine crises in the EU, the dichotomy of 
Euroscepticism against Euro-optimism seems to be the dominant line of the ideological 
and political confrontation. 
With the rise of the phenomenon itself, scholars expressed increased interest in 
the study of Euroscepticism. First attempts to study Euroscepticism as specifically 
Euroscepticism were made in 1990s. Benoit (1997) described and analyzed Eurosceptic 
tendencies in France, a compilation of Eurosceptic articles in Great Britain was issued as 
well.  A definition was given in by Taggart: “[Euroscepticism is an] idea of contingent or 
qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the 
process of European integration” (Taggart, 1998, p. 366). It was criticized for being too 
broad and led to it being refined by Taggart and Szczerbiak in 2001. In the improved 
version the differentiation between “hard” and “soft” Euroscepticism was introduced, it 
divides the Eurosceptics based on outright rejection of the EU and its principles to the 
point of leaving the Union on one side, and disagreeing on some policies but still viewing 
the EU as a thing to be change, on the other. Kopecky and Mudde pointed out the flaws 
in the improved definition of the term by stating that almost all Eurosceptics of the time 
could be classified under the “soft” type of Euroscepticism (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002). 
Thus, they introduced their own categories: Europragmatists, Euroenthusiasts, 
Eurosceptics and Eurorejects. 
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Another way of studying and defining Euroscepticism is sociological surveys, 
however they are less prominent as they deal with attitudes that are closer to the individual 
level. Such surveys usually don’t include the term itself, but rather pose questions related 
to national identity, whether a citizen of a select member state approves of the country’s 
membership in the EU, or on the general scope and speed of the integration process 
(Vasilopoulou, 2017). An attempt to construct a system of coordinates was made Krowel 
and Abts in 2007, as they argue that Euroscepticism is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. 
The first axis represents the approval of the European community, authorities and regime 
in whole, in relation to their responsiveness and overall competence; the other axis 
indicates three elements: “(a) the level of monitoring of the political environment, (b) the 
degree of openness to evaluating relevant information and (c) the extent of differentiation 
between the targets” (Krowel and Abts 2007: 254). Those axes combined provide a 
typology of attitudes towards the European project which consist of (from most to least 
favorable): Euro-confidence, Euro-scepticism, Euro-distrust, Euro-cynicism and Euro-
alienation (Krowel and Abts 2007: 254). 
Different theories outlined above show that Euroscepticism is a complex subject, 
with a number of possible interpretations and research designs. This phenomenon can 
shapeshift in the minds of people depending on how a question related to it may be asked. 
It can be viewed as graph, a system of coordinates or a spectrum, with each system having 
its own indicators and measures of definition. Some models are subjects of criticism 
because of their excessive inclusivity, others – because of their exclusivity, which leads 
to a point that the study of Euroscepticism comes with a choice – whether to select 
applicability or particularity (Vasilopoulou, 2017). 
Vasilopoulou contributed to the classification of Euroscepticism first in 2009 by 
introducing three criteria (that were upped to four in 2011) that defined the Eurosceptics’ 
attitude to the process of European Integration. Those are “a common cultural definition 
of Europe, the principle of cooperation at a European multilateral level, the EU policy 
practice and the desire to build a future European polity” (Vasilopoulou 2011: 224). 
Depending on the distribution of the factors several ideal types are formed which describe 
the Eurosceptic nature of the analyzed case study. They will be addressed in detail in the 
next chapters as this classification is chosen as a basis for the research in this thesis. 
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Post-Modern Liberalism vs Modern Conservativism 
A broad conceptual outline of what the two chosen case studies represent from a 
theoretical standpoint proves useful in order to determine the reasons for different 
outlooks between the EU and the Eurosceptics analyzed in this thesis. The Vasilopoulou 
typology sheds light on how the Eurosceptics act in the current EU system, while the 
comparison between modernity and post-modernity helps understand the fundamental 
differences in worldview between the EU and the Eurosceptic case studies. 
The current political system of the world is not of a monolithic property. The 
division which separates the world and the various actors in it includes many different 
factors and conditions. Robert Cooper in his book “The Breaking of Nations”, chapter 
“The New World Order” outlines the new world order (new – meaning after the ending 
of the Cold War), as consisting of three parts – the pre-modern, modern, and post-modern 
worlds (Cooper, 2003). There are actors in it which can be described as modern, post-
modern and in other different ways. The pre-modern actors are described as being in a 
condition of chaos, which coincides with the nature of not being a state by the classic 
definition of (e.g. having control over its territory), and overall being a product of post-
imperial times. This part of the new world order will not be discussed in detail in this 
thesis, as it will be evident later that the pre-modern characteristic does not fit the targets 
chosen for analysis. The second part of the world is characterized as modern. The classical 
definition of a state fits in this category. Modern states have the monopoly on usage of 
force on their territory, their borders are definite and secured. In this system states can be 
prepared to use force against each other if they deem it necessary to reach their goals. In 
this scenario the balance of power plays an important role in keeping the situation under 
a degree of control. With the possibility of use of force there comes a recognition of state 
borders, sovereignty, as well as the separation of domestic and foreign affairs by different 
actors (Cooper, 2003). The third part of the new system is the post-modern world. Here 
the state system states have less prevalence, akin to the pre-modern world. But the main 
difference is that in the pre-modern world there is a great disorder, while in post-modern 
world the system is organized in more orderly fashion than in a modern world. Cooper 
outlies two breaking points, which gave birth to the post-modern order of the world: the 
Treaty of Rome (1957), which was an attempt to organize international affairs in a manner 
which would go beyond bilateral nation-state interactions; and the Treaty on 
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Conventional Forces of Europe (1992), which was created as a means to put limits on 
types and amounts of weaponry that could be used by European states, as well as trying 
to rectify the larger hurdles brought by the Cold War. The modern and post-modern 
worlds are of most interest for the aims of this thesis. The countries examined in later 
parts of the research resemble the modern portion, while the European Union is similar 
to post-modern section, as Cooper himself writes in the book.  
The modern world is still pretty prevalent in the area of research of international 
relations. The closest example is realist theory, as it is based on similar assumptions such 
as a system of anarchy with no central controlling entity and the concept of balance of 
power. Cooper (2003) points out several problems that the area of the modern world 
entails – the balance of power is not omnipresent, and some regions such as the Middle 
East act as proof, while where it is present currently it is not guaranteed to last. Absence 
of balance of power can lead to interference from other actors and further destabilization 
which would in turn lead to possible devolution to a state of pre-modernity. In the modern 
world states develop at different speeds, and states that are developing faster than their 
neighbors can become a destabilizing factor for the region that they find themselves in 
or, if the technological advancement of a certain level is reached, for distant areas. Cooper 
(2003) sees rapid advancement as a precursor to imperial ambitions, having different 
possible reasons for the behaviour such as economic or ideological. A hegemony 
established by a regional leader is seen as being more possible of an outcome than a new 
world hegemon appearing, however regional hegemons can with time try to transition to 
more ambitious targets. 
The post-modern world, contrary to the modern world does not rely on the balance 
of power, respect of sovereignty of states and separation of domestic and foreign affairs 
as a system of coordinates. Cooper (2003) sees the European Union as an example of a 
post-modern system. Mutual interference in Cooper’s understanding is indeed present in 
the EU by the virtue of states voting in MPs of a single parliament and agreeing to share 
some competences with a supranational actor. The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 
(CFE) treaty, which most of the EU member states signed, marks a significant departure 
in the sovereignty and domestic-foreign affairs separation departments in comparison to 
the modern model of the world order. Parties to the treaty had to destroy a substantial 
amount of weaponry as well as limiting the production of some weaponry types. Due to 
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this the monopoly on usage of force is under constraints unlike in the modern world. 
Conventional thought incentivizes hiding military capabilities from potential enemies in 
order to have an element of surprise in the case of confrontation. Treaties which require 
conveying that information to other nation-states are seen as something out of the ordinary 
for actors in the modern world (Cooper, 2003). The post-modern world seeks to fix the 
distrust which different actors may have in relation to one another, in difference from the 
modern world. The notion that a state’s territorial neighbors may not want to attack it, 
and are not secretly building up their military strength comes as a surprise to those 
entering the post-modern world, and treaties like the CFE and the unique case of the EU 
try to ease that process and show lucrativeness of a trust-based relationship between 
actors. Cooper points out that for trust-based cooperation to work, intrusive verification 
is needed, which allows different actors to verify the actual state of affairs on the ground 
regarding military and other various matters. Intrusive verification is seen as a key 
element in the post-modern world, which breaks the absolution of state sovereignty. Thus, 
the modern distinction of domestic and foreign becomes not as clear as before. Some 
things become both of domestic and foreign nature in the post-modern world. If there 
were to be a dispute between members of the EU, they are greatly encouraged to settle it 
by using peaceful measures instead of force, as one of the aims of post-modern world is 
to try to make direct confrontation impossible by interlinking different actors together in 
such a way that use of force would be extremely disadvantageous for every party. It is 
assumed that states that part of the post-modern world have an interest in keeping the 
system intact as they have more to gain from it being functional, than breaking it down. 
Borders, which are one of the main elements of the modern world, are becoming 
less and less present in the post-modern world. In the case of the EU and the Schengen 
area, it would be difficult to notice for a traveler when exactly do they cross a border 
between member states. Inter-state security is based on transparency and trust, instead of 
close watch of borders and the people who cross them. As Cooper (2003) mentions, this 
situation is a revolution for international affairs compared to the modern world. However, 
one thing remains from the modern world – and that is the democratic process and 
institutions are still embedded in the nation-state. Such things as identity construction and 
elections (for example) are still within the realm of a given country, and are going to 
remain this way in the post-modern world in the foreseeable future. 
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International institutions are a one of the core elements that keep the post-modern 
system together. They are usually divided by different areas of expertise, and have 
different competences depending on various factors. Examples of such institutions 
include the International Criminal Court (ICC), International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
Strasbourg Court of Human Rights and others. These institutions also serve as a platform 
and link between different actors and are intended to be unbiased and objective. The ICC 
is a prime example of the division between international and domestic affairs being 
eroded in the post-modern world. In the EU justice system, the role of the supreme court 
is played by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The entities mentioned earlier create an 
additional element that exists separately from the traditional bilateral diplomatic efforts 
which are carried out by states in the modern world. Security problems in the post-modern 
system are really different from those of the modern predecessor, as they are essentially 
policy disputes between member-states and rarely anything more because those states do 
not have intentions of attacking each other. Cooper (2003) points out that when relations 
are good between two states in the post-modern system, that bond is stronger than that of 
the modern world, where two countries would have some sort of bilateral friendship 
agreement. 
Cooper (2003) indicates that the major reason for transformation from the modern 
to the post-modern is the rise of consciousness in the most developed states of the planet, 
and the subsequent abandonment of imperial ambitions and desire to resolve issues by 
usage of force. The two major international entities that prove that empirically are NATO 
and the European Union – their member states have not yet waged war against each other, 
and did abandon the ideas of imperial expansions. The EU through its many iterations 
provided Europe with a new degree of openness and ability to carry out inter-state 
conversations on another level. Even though EU member states may not always, and often 
in practice, do not agree with each other, they are all part of the same organization which 
allows them to settle disputes peacefully and openly, which is also in the interest of states 
that do not take part in any particular dispute but are still members of the EU. “[The EU] 
represents security through transparency and transparency through interdependence” 
(Cooper, 2003: 37). Some dream of a single European state, that would include all current 
member states. That dream stems from the notion that the nation-state itself is a dangerous 
entity and should be reorganized into a single formation, it is out of reach currently, as 
17 
 
the post-modern societies, even with the progressive mindset, are not yet ready for the 
abolishment of nation-states as units in the international relations system. There are some 
cases where, for example, Germany would try to exercise an influence on the rest of the 
member states, however that influence is not reached by threats of violence or sanctions, 
but by persuasion and other mutually beneficial ways of conduct. 
A concept that is similar to the one that Cooper writes about was discussed by 
Sorensen. He also tried to classify actors in a similar way by pointing out main differences 
in their behaviour and view of themselves. The ideal types that he outlines are the 
following: pre-modern, Westphalian and post-modern (Sorensen, 1998). The pre-modern 
type emerged as a result of the decolonization process, the post-modern is a result of 
economic globalization and originated in Europe, the Westphalian is a modern 
understanding of a state. This classification is similar to Cooper’s in many ways, 
including the naming of the ideal types.  
The pre-modern states are viewed by Sorensen as incomplete in a sense that they 
do not possess substantial statehood. Those states only have statehood “in the formal 
sense of judicial sovereignty” (Sorensen, 1998). Hierarchy is not well established, 
domestic order is not formulated or enforced. The law enforcement is not really concerned 
with enforcing the law or protection of the population There is no monopoly on violence 
which belongs to the state, domestic institutions are not developed, sometimes pre-
modern states are subjects to a system of “personal rule”. The ruler exerts control over 
the political mainstream in the state, trying to control and prevent others from becoming 
legitimate political actors. Economic development is at low levels, with different sectors 
being at different stages of evolution. The Westphalian state description is similar to the 
Cooper’s model of the modern world. Westphalian states are in possession of actual 
sovereignty, which is formed (unlike the pre-modern version) but is not yet shared with 
other actors as in the post-modern world. The economy is more independent than in the 
pre-modern case, but not fully integrated in the globalized ecosystem yet. The institutions 
gained their strength, but still are not on their way to an international network of 
international policy. The nationhood in the Westphalian state is most robust compared to 
two other ideal types, one of which is not formulated clearly, while the other is challenged 
by different identities due to globalization. 
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Post-modern states according to Sorensen are also conceptualized similarly to 
Cooper’s vision. Those countries are developed economically, are involved in 
globalization and have developed institutions. The economic development in those states 
is linked together by the process of globalization and worldwide distribution of labor and 
capital. Economic system of the post-modern is not enclosed on nation-state level, making 
those countries interdependent on each other’s economic development of crises. Thus, 
due to economic interdependence, cooperation is becoming more beneficial and other 
areas start being more interlinked as well. This however leads to the appearance of limits 
on sovereignty, as understood in the modern or Westphalian system. This loss of 
sovereignty manifests in states allowing other states to exercise influence in their own 
matters while being able to do so themselves as a returning favor. So, post-modern states 
can use their sovereignty as a bargaining material in negotiations to reach their goals. 
Sorensen points out that the EU is a special case of a post-modern system because the EU 
can pose binding rules for its members. The EU does not fit into traditional ways of 
bilateral cooperation, it appears to be a hybrid if viewed through that lens – it maintains 
the nation-state as a unit of measurement and key player, while changing aspects of the 
traditional notion of sovereignty (Sorensen, 1998). The definition of identity in the post-
modern sense also becomes blurry, as the modern and pre-modern feeling of being 
something whole in itself and unique is replaced by a mixture of different identities based 
on common ideals, geographical positions and other factors. 
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2. Typology of Euroscepticism 
Typologies in general are a tool that is used by social scientists to describe and 
study social phenomena. Describing social phenomena is only a part of a study. A 
typology helps with the simplification and categorization of that which a researcher finds 
as factual part of the work. It can also help develop concepts, as some things need to be 
stated conceptually before being understood empirically. Typologies can be used to 
“focus on the systematic component of phenomena which defy quantification” (Lehnert, 
2007). In this link typologies can either be focused on ideal or extracted types. Ideal type 
focused typologies are deductively derived, “mental images”. They are developed by 
isolating and combining the crucial aspects of a phenomenon into a whole. Extracted 
types focused typologies are derived inductively from empirical observation. Their main 
focus is not crucial features, they instead combine features that empirical phenomena 
under observation have in common. Another important property of a typology is the level 
of generality of the types created. The level of generality is usually increased with the 
number of attributes of values taken into account decreases (Lehnert, 2007). The third 
distinction that typologies can be differentiated by is whether they are classificatory or 
continuous. Classificatory typologies “refer each empirical case to exactly one type, the 
characteristics of which it shares”, the end result would be that the cases are assigned one 
type only and clear argumentation exists why that is the matter. Continuous typologies in 
contrast, “approximate a type to a greater or lesser degree”. For example - some country 
is more or less democratic than the other, but still democratic, according to the chosen 
parameters. 
Different countries in the European Union don’t express their Eurosceptic views 
in the same ways. Vasilopoulou in the 2009 article “Varieties of Euroscepticism: The 
Case of the European Extreme Right” proposed a method of classifying states according 
to different criteria, a typology. This typology was later improved in the 2011 article by 
the same author “European Integration and the Radical Right: Three Patterns of 
Opposition”. The method of Vasilopoulou proposes three a three-dimensional 
conceptualization of European integration/cooperation, to which the following aspects 
are central: the principle, the practice and the future of European Integration. These parts 
are derived from the relevant parts of the Treaties of the European Union (TEU), currently 
the Lisbon Treaty, as well as other considerations. Compared to the other typologies of 
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Euroscepticism, this one provides to be the most up-to-date and concise in terms of taking 
into account different factors and the differentiation of ideal types derived from them.  
Vasilopoulou conceptualizes the four parts in the following way: 
1. The definition – “the feeling of cultural, religious and historical bonds among the 
European peoples” (Vasilopoulou, 2011: 229). The definition that Mudde gives (which 
that was adopted by Vasilopoulou) is based on Europe being heir to ancient civilizations 
that were in its place geographically, as well as encompassing different nations inhabiting 
the continent currently. The cultural and geographic aspect of this classification of 
definitions helps define the self from the ‘other’; 
2. The principle – “wish and willingness for cooperation at a higher multilateral 
level” (Vasilopoulou, 2011: 230). The European level is presumed to be multilateral and 
not bilateral, and adherence to the principle signifies the actor’s desire to communicate 
and cooperate on a higher, European level. Bilateral cooperation between select states, 
for example under the ability to make trade under the European Free Trade Area, does 
not signify the adherence to the principle of European integration. The support for 
cooperation under, and involving the corresponding EU institutions and frameworks is 
essential to consider the actor’s support for the principle to be genuine; 
3.  The practice – “The EU institutional and policy status quo” or how the 
institutions interact with member states in practice (Vasilopoulou, 2011: 231). It consists 
of the overall way of decision making and processes of governance that the EU currently 
employs. Opposition to the practice of European integration signifies the opposition to 
the policy making process of the EU; 
4.  The future – “their [member states] wish to continue further cooperation 
transferring more policy competencies to the EU level” (Vasilopoulou, 2011: 232), or 
support of the deepening process of European integration. Support of this indicator 
showcases the actor’s support and desire to support and further carry out steps to develop 
cooperation under the umbrella of EU institutions. Opposition to this indicator signifies 
Eurosceptic tendencies and rejection of the current course and methods of moving 
forward as a closer Union without significant divisions between member states. 
These aspects are used to construct criteria to be used in a typology of 
Euroscepticism. Using the criteria Vasilopoulou defines three types of Euroscepticism 
(party-based), which are used to evaluate political parties: 
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1. Rejecting Euroscepticism: Vasilopoulou understands rejecting Eurosceptics as 
belonging to the far end of the denial of European integration in its current form. They 
reject the principles of integration, the practice of it, how the supranational institutions 
carry out their functions, and they see no possible solutions to bring it to a favorable state 
in the future. Such parties see that all policies should be a matter of domestic politics, not 
international (Vasilopoulou, 2009). Consequently, they are in favor of withdrawal from 
the EU to reach their goals and preferred vision of governance, aiming to restore their 
initial sovereignty and the power of domestic institutions. The legitimacy of the EU as a 
supranational actor is denied. 
2. Conditional Euroscepticism: Conditional Eurosceptics are conceptualized as 
seeing some benefits of international cooperation and integration with regards to the 
nation-state. But they only see those positive effects only through the lens of utility to the 
country. That is the main condition for them – state sovereignty should not be 
compromised by the process of integration under any circumstances (Vasilopoulou, 
2009). Thus, they do not accept the current balance of domestic-supranational distribution 
of competences and are against further future development of Eurointegration in that 
paradigm. Conditional Eurosceptics are mostly in favor of intergovernmental 
development of cooperation and argue that the main decisions must be made by the 
nation-states excluding the EU, in order to safeguard national interests and sovereignty. 
They endorse the reform of the EU in order to shape further integration in a different way. 
“…both the practice of integration and the institutional balance of powers are dismissed, 
intergovernmental cooperation within the EU structures and in policies deemed beneficial 
to the nation-state are largely supported” (Vasilopoulou, 2011: 233). The legitimacy of 
the EU is not denied fully, but to the extent of decisions made for member-states. 
3. “Compromising Euroscepticism: those parties are portrayed as in favor of the 
current principle of European integration and are accepting of a common European 
culture but are opposed to the future prospects where that process could lead. 
Compromising Eurosceptics admit that a degree of integration is not desirable politically, 
but can be a means of achieving economic prosperity for their state (Vasilopoulou, 2009). 
In general, they are in favor of economic cooperation but want the EU to have more 
respect for national interests. “This implies a willingness to play by the rules of the game, 
aiming to reinforce the EU’s intergovernmental aspect as well as the member states’ 
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decision-making power, typically – but not necessarily – to the detriment of supranational 
institutions” (Vasilopoulou, 2011: 233). Such parties do not advocate for “an ever closer 
union” though, as that process of deepening integration would be contributing reinforcing 
of federalism due to its all-encompassing nature and consequences (Vasilopoulou, 2011). 
The typology outlined above views actors adopting more of a sovereignty-based 
stance instead of a policy-based one. These types are also presented as a table: 
Party positions on European integration 
 Rejecting Conditional Compromising 
Definition In favor In favor In favor 
Principle of European 
integration/cooperation 
Against In favor In favor 
Practice of European 
integration/cooperation 
Against Against In favor 
Future of European 
integration/cooperation 
Against Against Against 
Table 1: Party positions on European integration (Vasilopoulou, 2011) 
In this table the definition part of the typology is shows as the same in all three 
positions on European integration. Europe is seen as composed of “Greek democracy, 
Roman legal tradition and Christianity” (Vasilopoulou, 2011: 234), these three elements 
provide the trifecta of which contemporary Europe exists and where it derives its culture. 
They also provide a solid basis for right-wingers’ rejections of Turkey’s possible EU 
ascension, which seems more and more distant lately, due to the internal political 
processes in that country. Overall the definition of European integration provides a single 
common ground that the majority of right-wing Eurosceptics can agree to stand on 
currently. 
Another important facet that all Eurosceptics seem to be focused on and is part of 
their everyday rhetoric is sovereignty. All three types outlined above seem to negatively 
view the transfer of policy making tools and opportunities to the European institutions. 
They view this process as stripping their countries of power that they had inherited with 
history. There are some differences between the types in the ways that they see 
sovereignty can be preserved or regained (Vasilopoulou, 2011): conditional Eurosceptics 
think that some issues cannot be solved only on a domestic political level, they are willing 
to cooperate on the multilateral level, however that cooperation can happen in the EU 
framework only if it is reformed according to their vision; compromising Eurosceptics 
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also oppose the transfer of sovereignty, but they accept the current status of EU policy 
making and European integration. That concession is made due to the advantages that a 
certain degree of European integration can bring to the nation states’ economy. Thus, the 
main difference between compromising and conditional Eurosceptics lies in the way the 
current status quo of the EU framework. Rejecting Eurosceptics radiate the most 
uncompromising stance on the state of European integration and its practices. 
It is theoretically possible to construct another typology that takes economic matters 
into account more. However, the parties in government that are analyzed in this thesis 
adopt a more of a sovereignty-based rhetoric instead of a policy-based one. Judging by 
the speeches party documents they are less concerned with economic policies and are 
more explicit in expressing overall criticism of the EU.  
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3. Methodology 
 The comparative method, in particular the “Structured and Focused Comparison” 
form of it was chosen as the main tool of analysis for this thesis. Comparison in itself is 
an essential tool of analysis which is has multiple things subjected to it. It helps to bring 
into the light both similarities and differences in the cases being examined, depending on 
the task at hand. Comparison can help formulate a hypothesis or answer a research 
question, which is the main application of the method here. Usually a comparative 
analysis is used when taking a look at a relatively small number of cases. This allows the 
researcher to single out needed properties that require comparison and put aside some 
things that can interfere with the quality of the research. 
The most notable point of departure in the literature on the comparative method is 
the article by Arend Lijphart “Comparative Politics and the Comparative method” written 
in 1971. It is considered to be a concise and well thought out piece of research on the 
intricacies of the method and its issues. In the article Lijphart defines the method as a tool 
to analyse a small number of cases (at least two), with the premise that the number of 
cases should be large enough to warrant statistical analysis. He also puts emphasis on 
several key characteristics of the comparative method: first, that it is, indeed, a method, 
and not just a “a convenient term vaguely symbolizing the focus of one’s research 
interests”; second, that it is one of the scientific methods, not the one (one of the main 
aims of the article is the assessment of the comparative method in relation to other 
methods, such as statistical, experimental and case-study); third, that the method is a tool 
of discovering empirical relationships between variables, as opposed to a method of 
measurement.  
Lijphart (1971) goes on with his analysis of the different methods and points out 
that the comparative method is weaker in terms of testing hypotheses then the statistical 
and experimental methods, but stronger than the case-study method in that regard. He 
also points out that the needed preparations and requirements that need to be available to 
carry out a study using the comparative method are less than statistical or experimental 
methods require, however greater than for case-studies. Thus, the comparative method is 
more suitable when resources are available in modest amounts, he concludes. One of the 
main issues of the comparative method is defined in the article as the problem of “many 
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variables, few cases”, which arises when the researcher tries to take too many things into 
account while carrying out the comparison. Lijphart (1971) provides several possible 
solutions (these proposals later prompted various discussions and assessments of their 
ability to fix the outlined problems):  
1.   Increasing the number of cases. This could possibly lead to a transformation 
from a small N to a large N research project. Large N research which is based on using 
the comparative method can have various limiting factors which can hinder its chances 
for a successful inference formulation. Some viewed the increase of N would lead to a 
metamorphosis of the study itself into a quantitative data-driven project, as it would 
require obtaining large amounts of data and development of models of comparison, which 
would in turn make data collection and verification more difficult. Others were more 
optimistic and tried to make large N quantitative comparisons work, which was made 
easer as time went on and newer statistical methods, as well as technologies, were 
developed closer to the end of the 20th century. 
2.   Decreasing the number of variables (by eliminating some or combining several 
into one). This solution implies that the researcher ought to possibly reduce the amount 
of data that is used in a study. Another proposal is to categorize the concepts used by the 
researcher, using the method of “classical categorization” (Lakoff, 1987), that gives the 
concepts meaning based on their defining characteristics, which in turn make the concept 
boundaries “clearer”. This should be done carefully though, as such actions can blur the 
image of a resulting categorization and decrease the precision of conceptualization. 
3.   Ironing out the cases themselves by trying to use only the most comparable 
ones. The obvious deduction that stems from this action is that the more similar the cases 
selected, the lesser their number would be, which is a trade-off to be evaluated by the 
researcher. Lijphart himself is in favor of selecting fewer cases with a subsequent careful 
analysis. Others, like Przerworski (1970) and Teune (1987) are more skeptical of this 
approach because they think that it could lead to overdetermination, which in turn leads 
to elimination of too many contesting explanations making the actual criteria disappear 
and making comparison difficult. They offer a different approach, which is based on 
selecting cases that are, on the contrary, highly diverse, and the following research should 
be focused on tracing similar processes which happen among them. These approaches are 
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currently known as Most Similar Systems Design and Most Different Systems Design. 
The discussion and evaluation of these two methods produced a debate on whether 
geographical proximity is good enough substitute to the analysis by merit or analytic 
requirements. Analysis by merit started becoming more popular due to the technological 
advancements and easier data access. 
Later studies of the comparative method try to provide different solutions to the 
problems that were outlined by Lijphart (1971), as well as working on other issues. One 
such point of interest is the overall goal of comparison. Skopol and Somers (1980) argue 
that comparative analysis should not be used to reach a single goal (assessment of rival 
explanations by testing a hypothesis) but as to reach multiple goals. These are: the 
“systematic examination of covariation among cases for the purpose of causal analysis”, 
“examination of number of cases with the goal of showing that a particular model or set 
of concepts usefully illuminates these cases” (Collier, 1993), highlighting the ways in 
which parallel processes are developing in different ways while examining different 
cases. These more detailed goals provide a broader picture on how comparative analysis 
can be conducted. 
The second methodological pivot of the comparative method is the explanation and 
justification of the use of several (small N) cases. Lijphart argued that the small amount 
of resources needed to carry out a comparative study can pave way for a larger statistical 
study which could use the inferences made in a comparative study of similar character. A 
notable research on how to fix this issue was done in the book “Social Science Concepts” 
written by Sartori in 1984. His main inference and conclusion is that the increase of the 
number of cases can lead to a “stretching” of a concept, as the researcher tries to fit the 
increased number of cases into their theoretical framework and use the existing meanings 
of used concepts on phenomena that might not fit. This in turn leads to weaker focus on 
the differences and similarities of the cases which is one the main tenets of comparison 
itself. Sartori argues that the increase of number of cases should thus be done with great 
caution. A similar research on the problems of increasing cases was made by Teune 
(1970) who tried to provide a guideline for researchers who are on their way to increasing 
the number of cases. The main tenet was to try to figure out or define a single concept 
which would manifest itself in different contexts but would do so distinctly. 
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As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter the method to be used for this thesis 
is called “Structured and Focused Comparison”. The subject matter of Euroscepticism 
requires detailed accounts of the positions, statements and documents that are related by 
the respective case studies, the method pays special attention to the historical precursors 
of the studied phenomenon, and a careful analysis of the status quo with taking into 
analysis of different factors. Due to attention to detail and focus on a specified period of 
time this method is deemed the most suitable for this research task. This method was 
introduced by George and Bennett in 2005. It was developed in order to study foreign 
policy and make inferences when analyzing problems in international relations. The focus 
of this method is to make comparison between cases and data straightforward and logical. 
The application of the method consists of the researcher posing questions regarding each 
of the chosen cases, that makes comparison easier by standardizing data and comparative 
points. The “focused” part of the method implies that cases are examined only within a 
specified period of time and specified part of the relevant cases. In order to this method 
to be successful the research must have clearly defined boundaries of the cases to be 
examined. The cases should all be similar in a sense that they should all represent one 
phenomenon. In this thesis the phenomenon is Euroscepticism. 
The structured and focused comparison method borrows the way of seeking 
answers to standard, general questions from the statistical and survey research methods 
(George and Bennett, 2005). The usage of general questions is appropriate due to the need 
of obtaining comparable data in the study. Also, this prevents each case study going in its 
own different direction, as the research progresses. The focus in the method implies that 
the study should be carried out with a specific research objective, and a theoretical focus 
relevant to that objective. Any episode or case should be discussed in accordance with 
the theoretical framework or frameworks that were selected (the typology of 
Euroscepticism and the modern vs. post-modern dichotomy). It is also important to build 
upon previous studies, as that helps in identifying and placing the present research in 
context. 
When seeking answers to the questions to be posed during research, the case studies 
are analyzed carefully. That analysis will in the end give answers to the questions given 
and to the research question itself. The analysis of case studies starts with the definition 
of the context in which the whole research takes place. The general context in this thesis 
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is the state of EU internal politics in the wake of the refugee crisis. The actualization of 
this context leads to the construction of a defined narrative in which the research takes 
place and case studies are compared. Following that the actual analysis takes place – the 
explanations of outcomes of each case study appear here (George and Bennett, 2005). As 
the authors of the method state, that is the matter of detective work and historical analysis. 
That includes incorporating contextual cues where they are available, searching through 
large amounts of data – that is necessary because of generality of the posed research 
question. 
George and Bennett present several caveats that should be taken into account while 
using their method. These caveats can be considered general possible drawbacks of this 
method, which still has proved to be a useful tool of foreign policy analysis over time. 
The analysis of case studies should not be presented as true first and foremost. In order 
to avoid one-sidedness, the alternative explanations should be mentioned and examined. 
That helps avoiding the imposition of the researcher’s opinion as the sole correct one. If 
there are several competing explanations to a single case outcome, those should be 
reconciled if possible. That is more difficult if the competing explanations are consistent 
with the historical base and are in other ways similar. If reconciliation is not possible, 
either the most suitable explanation should be chosen or, if the number of them prove to 
be equally plausible, that should be stated clearly. The explanations made by the 
researcher ideally are to be transformed from factual to analytical or theoretical. This 
procedure is not always possible as in different cases the loss of information which 
undoubtedly occurs during the process, and the degree to which that invalidates the 
inferences can vary greatly. 
The reconstruction of policy decisions, which is a central theme of this thesis, is 
also to be treated with care (George and Bennett, 2005). The reliability of data is a central 
theme of this task. While there may be a single reputable and proven historical 
explanation to a policy decision, the alternative theories should not be ignored, but 
analyzed accordingly. Such analysis can include the debates of different researchers on a 
single case, while highlighting the possible biases of each and possible gaps in existing 
historical accounts. Even with those procedures carried out, the explanations examined 
are not guaranteed to provide the answers to the posed questions (George and Bennett, 
2005). For this matter it may prove useful to not use very old literature, as the 
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aforementioned gaps are more likely to be present in it, while the more contemporary 
works are more likely to have the missing information of the former and draw better 
conclusions. Another caution that should be taken is to not hold the primary sources, such 
as declassified government documents or other official information in high and sole 
regard, as in to be sufficient to provide answers to the stated questions. Contextual 
developments of the historic events in questions may be omitted in such documents but 
must be taken into account for a successful research. Policymakers can find themselves 
in situations that are only made clear after a contemporary public account appears. To 
distill an interview of a policy maker, for example, it should be noted who is the 
interviewee talking to, under what circumstances does the interview happen, and for what 
purpose that interview is held. For an analysis of a document – the role of document in 
the policy making process should be stated, what general purpose does it serve, and how 
does it fit into the greater context of communication by the entity that issued it and who 
were the actual people involved in the process of its creation. This is also is to be done 
carefully, as researchers and people in general tend to attach significance to events that 
support their narrative while downplaying the significance of events that do not. This 
should be avoided in research, as it is essentially a double standard. It is known that the 
production of policy papers greatly depends on the ulterior motive of those who create 
them. Examples include self-service, meaningful deception or distortion (George and 
Bennett, 2005). 
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4. Polish Eurosceptic tendencies 
Polish government and the analyzed party in power currently employ a Eurosceptic 
position, but it was not always that way. Polish political discourse after the regime change 
in 1989 were based on two fundamental rules: “Poland aimed towards European and 
Atlantic integration (in NATO and the EU) and that, as in the Giedroyc doctrine, it 
supported the independence and democratization of Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania” 
(Kucharczyk and Meseznikov, 2015: 105). Further integration into Europe was seen as 
successful alternative to the socialist past in many regards. 
The popularity of the European Union in Polish society contrasted with the 
positions of a number of political parties in Poland, especially the parties of the ruling 
coalition – United Right (Law and Justice, Alliance, United Poland, Republican Party – 
all right-wing political parties). Skepticism was widespread on the right side of the Polish 
political spectrum. The first signs of Euroscepticism can be found immediately after the 
presidential elections of 1995, when Poland was still at the stage of preparation for future 
EU membership. After the electoral defeat of then-president Walesa, there was a 
strengthening of the positions of the right parties and the strengthening of elements hostile 
to the EU. Moreover, despite the support of some ideas of European integration by the 
most important institutions of Poland (the Catholic Church, trade unions), many 
representatives of these structures were very suspicious of the nature of the European 
Union and its possible impact on the traditions and culture of Poland. After a number of 
statements made by Pope John Paul II in 1997, the position of the Church became 
generally pro-integration. However, some influential organizations, such as the 
fundamentalist Catholic radio station “Radio Maria”, continued to be critical of the 
secular and liberal nature of the EU. In turn, this has had a significant impact on many 
right-wing parties, including Law and Justice (Brannitsky, Savov, 2011). 
A radical change in public opinion occurred at the end of 2005, when the majority 
(54%) expressed support for membership in the polls (Eurobarometer 64, 2005). This 
figure was higher than the average for the European Union as a whole. At the same time, 
it would be wrong to say that all indicators have increased. Thus, the society remained 
having a distrust of a number of European institutions, and 53% of Poles felt that their 
opinion was not taken into account in the decision-making process in Brussels. However, 
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the record high level of support for the expansion and deepening of European integration 
confirmed the new status of the Polish people as one of the main supporters of the EU. 
Analyzing the Euroscepticism of the political elite, it is notable that the position of 
the Polish elite is more prone to emotional factors. Most of the objections in this context 
are limited to the possible disappearance of the identity of the Polish national character 
and the threat of the EU in relation to religious life, cultural values and traditions of the 
state. In Polish society as a whole, cultural and ideological aspects did not have a 
significant impact on the formation of skeptical rhetoric. Before joining the European 
Union, the Polish people were rather concerned about the impact of this step on the 
situation in the state economy and the impact on the crime situation in the country 
(Brannitsky, Savov, 2011). 
Poland has wanted to see itself in leading positions in Eastern Europe. In the new 
conditions, relying on a strategic alliance with the United States, it would like to become 
a regional influencer, having a say in the EU and thus strengthening the Polish influence 
in Ukraine and Belarus. Polish ambitions do not always find support among the other 
countries of the Union, especially when Polish Eastern policy faces the interests of other 
political actors. Such examples include the scandal with the Polish export of meat to 
Russia in 2007 and disagreements over the construction of the Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas 
pipelines in the North and Baltic seas. In both cases, poles felt abandoned by their EU 
partners, and Polish politicians expressed their frustration. With the UK leaving the 
European Union, the Polish authorities are deemed to be losing an important ally and fear 
that Germany will now play an even more prominent role in the Union. The proposal of 
the foreign Ministers of Germany and France to create a “Carolingian Core” within the 
EU scares both Poland and other states of the Visegrad group. This creates a basis for 
enhanced cooperation between them. Currently there is a common perceived desire of 
key countries in the region to reduce their dependence on Brussels and Berlin (Georgiev, 
2017). 
Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) is a Polish right-wing conservative 
party that adheres to traditional. The party is currently in power and holds the majority of 
seats in the national parliament, it is one the case studies analyzed in the thesis. 
Euroscepticism and commitment to cooperation with the United States, a negative attitude 
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towards the EU, Germany and Russia are the basis of the policies proclaimed by this 
party. In the wake of anti-immigrant and anti-European sentiments, the majority of seats 
in the Polish parliament was received by the PiS party. 
The most recent presidential election of 2015 marked the success of the right-wing 
conservatives of Law and Justice. Then president Bronisław Komorowski, nominated by 
the Civic Platform party, lost to Andrzej Duda of PiS (The Guardian, 2015). The political 
agenda of the winning candidate included anti-immigrant and nationalist rhetoric, as well 
as appeals to the mechanisms of direct democracy (the introduction of referendums) and 
the creation of single-mandate constituencies to transform the Polish electoral system 
from proportional to mixed (Lykoshina, 2015). 
The history of the PiS party, is closely connected with the activities of the brothers 
Lech and Jaroslav Kaczynski. Both politicians were active members of the opposition in 
socialist Poland. After the fall of the Communist regime Lech Kaczynski defended the 
need for consistent “decommunization” of all aspects of life of the Polish state, as they 
were convinced that the previous regime was criminal.  
Lech Kaczynski became especially popular in Polish society in the early 2000s. As 
Minister of justice in the government of Buzek (the prime minister of Poland from 1997 
to 2001), he led a fight against crime, trying to break the links between the world of 
politics and the criminal world. In the press of those years it was noted that Kaczynski 
was the first Polish politician whose goal was to make a serious stand against organized 
crime. According to opinion polls, he occupied the 2nd place (after the President 
Kwaśniewski during that time) among the politicians who enjoyed the one of the highest 
trust ratings among the Poles (Centre for Public Opinion Research, 2001). Thus, it is not 
surprising that in 2002 during the first direct elections Kaczynski became mayor of 
Warsaw. It is under the leadership of Lech Kaczynski in 2001 the PiS party itself was 
established. In the parliamentary elections of the same year, it received the support of 
9.50% of the voters, which was a tolerable result for the then young party (Lykoshina, 
2005). In the wake of numerous corruption scandals in the early 2000s, the positions and 
program of the PiS party found increasing support of voters. Its representatives still 
continued to pursue a course of battle against corruption in the country. The aim was to 
provide an alternative to the Solidarity Electoral Action and Polish Peasants’ parties 
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which both stood on right-wing positions. PiS won 44 seats in the parliament which was 
more than the two parties mentioned earlier (BBC, 2001). Even though all three parties 
were right-wing PiS succeeded in winning most seats due to populist rhetoric and 
authoritarian tendencies which were aimed at a specific part of the Polish electorate. Law 
and Justice blamed most of the shortcomings in the public life of Poland blamed on the 
preservation of the country’s significant influence of the former Communist 
nomenclature. Therefore, the recovery of society and the state she associated with the 
detachment of Poland from the heritage of the socialist past. It is important to note that 
being a conservative party, PiS does not seek to conserve socialist values and norms. 
As a result, in the parliamentary elections of 2005, Law and justice came in first 
place, which allowed it to form a government (Polish National Electoral Commission, 
2005). PiS won 155 seats which were not enough to reach the absolute majority, however 
every other party had worse results. The next success of the party was the victory in the 
presidential elections of the same year of its first chairman Lech Kaczynski. 
At the time PiS was already a critic of some parts of European integration. And, 
like today the party was maintaining its positive attitude towards NATO in security 
matters and cooperation, that approach was historically warmer in comparison to the 
relations with European Union. PiS saw the EU as an entity with strong nation-states at 
its core, in contrast with sharing specific competences between the EU institutions and 
the member states (Kopecky, Mudde, 2002). At the time this was a clear marker of strong 
Eurosceptic tendencies being present within the party. PiS maintained is Eurosceptic 
position, maintaining support for traditional values, populist agenda and critical attitude 
towards economic liberalism. 
Thus, Law and Justice had the opportunity to implement its plan for radical reforms 
of the different areas of the political and social life of the Polish state. Speaking to the 
Sejm, the representative of PiS and the Prime Minister of Poland K. Marcinkiewicz said 
about the need to “correct the state” and “return to power the nature of effective and 
honest service” (Polish parliament session transcript from November 10th, 2005). He 
called the Polish state as a spoiled “mechanism that does not properly perform the 
functions for which it was created” as well as being spoiled morally (Marcinkiewicz, 
2005). To his mind in such circumstances effective governance is difficult to achieve. 
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In general, post-Warsaw pact Poland had the strongest consensus amongst the elites 
in terms of EU ascension in the whole region of East Central Europe, while having a 
critically opinionated electorate (Kopecky, Mudde, 2002). However, even with that 
consensus in mind, there were significant voices in the Polish political sphere that called 
for greater respect of Polish interests in the ascension process. That attitude was the first 
precursor of Eurosceptic moods in the recently independent country. 
An important activity of PiS is the struggle for truth in the coverage of the history, 
socio-economic and political life of modern Poland. Jaroslaw Kaczynski during his 
speech at the PiS party congress in 2013 congress quoted his brother Lech Kaczynski, 
who believed that “rightness in history is unevenly distributed” (Wiadomości, 2013). In 
his opinion, it was primarily on the side of those who fought for freedom. The overall 
slogan of the congress was “Our homeland. Our future”. Jaroslaw Kaczynski noted that 
these words reflect the most important issues of Polish public life. “Our homeland is 
Poland, which means that the future is in Poland” (Kaczynski, 2013) the party chairman 
stressed. He drew attention to the fact that the Polish state should be seen not only as an 
organization but also as a “moral quality”, it must be “secured morally and historically” 
(Kaczynski, 2013). “Today we are witnessing an attack on these values” (Kaczynski, 
2013), Kaczynski concluded. Thus, from the speech of the leader of the party it could be 
concluded that PiS, seeing itself as belonging to the tradition of the liberation struggle of 
the Polish people, imagines having a special right to interpret the past and present of 
Poland, and, apparently, to determine the future of the country (including the relations 
with the EU). 
Supporters of PiS are convinced that the national elite should constantly take care 
of strengthening the sovereignty of the country. This task is especially important in the 
context of the growing (as the party and its supporters envision) influence of international 
structures on the domestic and foreign policy of modern states, including Poland. Another 
important task proclaimed by PiS is to build a society based not on clientelistic (or 
asymmetrical) ties, but on business and professional relations, in which backstage 
agreements don’t play a decisive role, but instead competence and professionalism, with 
interests of public good playing a leading role. PiS see power in the country not belonging 
to those who question Polish values and view them as inferior to European values and, in 
their opinion, are ready to accept instructions from “the outside” in the matters of 
35 
 
domestic politics. They want the country’s leaders to be rooted in Poland, in the Polish 
national traditions, being loyal to the state Poland, as opposed to international structures, 
or the EU institutions in particular.  
Another important task that PiS sees itself completing is to overcome the apparent 
split in Polish society. The party does not absolve itself of responsibility for the fact that 
its activities in the early 2000s contributed to the development of this process of splitting. 
However, a significant part of the blame for this split PiS imposes on the Civic Platform 
party, which is currently in opposition and is reproaching the current. The ideology of the 
Civic platform party is currently consisting of moving in in the direction of the population, 
which does not understand the aspirations of PiS, are in favor of a softer stance in general, 
and suspect that PiS may have intentions which would lead to negative consequences for 
the country. 
In the context of analyzing the views of the Polish government and the PiS party it 
would be useful to take a look at the platform which the party adopted for the 2014 
European Parliament election. It should be noted that the views expressed in the platform 
for this election are mostly consistent with what the party want to see changed in 
contemporary EU. PiS ran as an opposition party, as at the time the Civic Platform party 
had the advantage in the national parliament, while winning the same amounts of seats in 
the European Parliament – 19 (European Parliament, 2014). The party manifesto states 
that the biggest problem that Poland is facing currently due to the politics of the then 
ruling party (Civic Platform) is the inability to realize the national interests of the country. 
PiS deems that the Polish foreign and security policies can’t be blind followers of 
supranational institutions’ decisions and acting only in accordance with the European 
integration agenda. “Europe will be stronger with a stronger, empowered and more 
dynamic Poland…” (Gagatek, 2014: 306) – this quote is very telling of how the PiS party 
views the development of the European Union, while pointing the role and stance of 
Poland as a member state. The party views the country’s membership in international 
bodies as an opportunity to further its interests as opposed to weakening Polish 
subjectivity, while also stating that Poland should be able to act independently on the 
world stage. As for security matters the PiS party view inter-state security cooperation as 
an addition to the sovereign decisions made by each state which is a member of EU and 
NATO, in order to not lead to extreme interdependencies and subsequent creation of some 
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sort of security hierarchy. The need to have the power to determine bilateral and 
multilateral foreign policies is also underlined a one of the most important factors in the 
Polish stance worldwide. In general, PiS views the Union not as an organization with ever 
continuing integration and centralization of competences in the EU hands, but as a Union 
with more freedom of action for member states and more solidarity between them, a 
“return to the roots of European integration” (Gagatek, 2014: 309). 
The EU is also seen as an international organization with sovereign states as 
members. The application of the EU laws is allowed to be carried out only because it is 
allowed by the Polish constitution. PiS maintains the position that as long as the EU 
integration process progresses, more and more powers should be directed to state 
governments in order to shape the integration process itself. So, a transfer of competences 
to the EU level should correspond to equal supervision opportunities by the state 
authorities. This opinion highlights the party’s stance on the future of European 
integration. The larger view on the European Union integration policies are viewed 
through the lens of a weakening Union. PiS deems the post-crisis model that the EU 
adopted to be a subpar one, which causes democratic deficit, over-regulation in some 
areas, as well loss of traditional values and state identity. The party condemns the 
apparent attempts of the EU to gain control over competences by using executive acts and 
broad interpretation of EU law.  
PiS states that every member state should be able to “shape its own model of social 
order and not be subjected to any ‘cultural re-education’ from the outside” (Gagatek, 
2014: 308), which signifies that the party sees its views on sovereignty in terms of values 
and social structure as suitable for adoption across the EU. In the matters of economics, 
the party views the national budget being under control of EU officials as a detriment to 
Polish sovereignty and the democratic control by its own people. The platform also 
highlights the importance of keeping the national currency, negotiating the climate and 
energy agreements in order to suit the polish national economic interests better.  
In regards the future of Poland-NATO cooperation as well a larger outlook on EU 
security a letter was published by a Polish official Edmund Janniger, special 
representative for global strategic communication of the minister of national defense. The 
letter, written in 2016, is an answer to an article by Politico in which the publication 
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implies that the NATO-Poland relationship is not as strong as it was, and pointed out the 
Polish side of the relationship as the one at fault for the mentioned hurdles, by attempting 
to reform the justice system of the country (Politico, 2016), which was mentioned earlier. 
Janniger retaliates, and states that compared to the previous government, the current one 
takes security matter more seriously and advocates for stronger US military presence on 
Polish territory, as well as mentioning that Poland is situated on the Eastern “border” of 
NATO, which is a crucial position in wake “…an increasingly imperialist Russia” 
(Politico, 2016). However, there is one quote that stands out in the whole body of the 
letter, as it deals with matters of Polish attitudes towards the European project. “NATO 
is a military alliance. Its role is certainly not to impose a form of European political 
correctness on the Polish people” (Politico, 2016). NATO, still being the primary topic 
of the letter is linked by Janniger to the promotion of European values that are seen as 
being imposed on Poland by the alliance. Janniger himself, being a special representative 
of the minister of national defense of Poland, has the capacity to officially represent the 
state government, as he is appointed by it and the party which is currently in power. This 
signifies the negative attitude that the current Polish government has towards the system 
of values the EU emits and promotes. A united view on core values such as separation 
between different branches of governmental power is necessary for Poland and the EU to 
coexist in harmony. A dismissal of those values, formulated in an official letter signifies 
a problematic view of the Polish government on the future of its relations with EU and 
that it may have issues with the way some competences may be shared between the two 
actors. 
A legislation was proposed by President Duda in 2017 could have significant 
ramifications for EU-Polish relations. “A parliamentary commission in Warsaw approved 
two controversial new laws Thursday night that would allow the government to dismiss 
many of the country’s Supreme Court judges — a move the European Commission has 
said could result in EU sanctions.” (Politico, 2017). The European Commission warned 
the Polish government that such judicial reforms are not in line with the principles and 
practices of the EU, to which the Polish state agreed when it signed the EU treaty. As a 
specific method of influence, the representatives of the Commission would recommend 
the European Council to make use of Article 7 of the EU treaty. This measure could 
ultimately lead to Poland losing its EU voting rights, which are valued by the country 
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despite its current Eurosceptic course. Only recently, the law was suspended following 
the ruling of the European court of justice, which ordered the Polish government to stop 
the application of the law. PiS submitted a bill to the parliament which would reinstate 
the previously fired judges to their earlier positions in courts (Deutsche Welle, 2018). At 
the time of the writing of this thesis the party reversed the legislation which shows the 
success of the EU measures and the slight change of the overall Polish position. 
This chapter outlined the main facets and positions of the current Polish leadership 
and provided a picture of what the PiS party thinks about in context of the country’s 
relations with the EU. The focus was made on the current state of affairs in a chosen time-
frame, with historical context in mind, as is required by the method chosen for this thesis. 
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5. Hungarian Eurosceptic tendencies 
The government of Viktor Orban at the time of his inauguration in 2010 took 
over a country with one with high amounts of external debt and a social sphere which was 
damaged, according to him. Orban immediately began to implement various reforms. 
Fidesz (his political party) chose a radical path. The party began to create a right-
conservative project of withdrawal of the state from the political and economic crisis 
which according to their positions plagued the EU at the time. Many elements did not 
correspond to the ideals of the Western world. The government hoped to show that there 
is a right-wing alternative and tries to challenge the European paradigm to this day. 
At the beginning of its existence Fidesz started out as a movement which at its 
core contained anticommunist and liberal ideas. Due to those ideas it was a party 
expressing views which were in favor of the European Union. EU was seen as a successful 
alternative to the socialist past from the economic perspective and proving that Western 
values are better that Eastern and should be at the core of Hungarian society at the time 
(Kopecky, Mudde, 2002). As the 20th century was getting closer to its end, the Fidesz 
party started changing is views on European integration from pragmatic approach to one 
focused on social and cultural aspects (Navracsics, 1997). The party leader - Victor Orban 
started transmitting Eurosceptic messages at the beginning of the 21st century, similar to 
the views of Vaclav Claus, who was the prime minister of the Czech Republic (Green, 
2000). At the time those two politicians were the only ones who had Eurosceptic elements 
to their position in the whole region of East Central Europe (Kopecky, Mudde, 2002) 
Hungary’s economic policy became national in its orientations with the coming 
to power of the Fidesz party. The new cabinet undermined the IMF and EU policies that 
presumably failed the state in previous years. New taxes have been introduced for banks 
and large corporations (in the spheres of telecommunications and energy). The new taxes 
had the goal to weaken the impact of transnational corporations on the Hungarian 
economy (before Fidesz came to power, the level of production by them was consisting 
of 70% of the gross domestic product), a flat income tax rate of 16% was introduced 
(Reuters, 2010). 
The government of Orban bought shares in strategic enterprises (some EU 
member states used privatization as a measure to combat the economic crisis of the time). 
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The Hungarian government privatized pension funds, and established state control over 
the central bank of the country. The government had to reduce social benefits (for 
example disability benefits and early retirement). Orban argued that the adopted norms 
helped Hungary to not repeat the situation in Greece, which he views as a worst-case 
scenario. This shows nation-centric tendencies in the handling of national economics.  
Fidesz carried out a constitutional reform in 2011, making 174 proposals and 6 
amendments to the main law of the country (Fundamental Law of Hungary, 2016). In the 
document it is said that Hungary did not possess sovereignty until May 1990, and was 
deprived of its sovereignty in March 1944, when German troops entered Hungary 
(Fundamental Law of Hungary, 2016). A special place in the Constitution is occupied by 
a provision of recognition of marriage only between a woman and a man, negative 
rhetoric regarding abortions, while those are still legal. This provision opens up legal 
possibilities to make abortions illegal, however no steps were taken in that direction yet. 
The Constitution states that today Hungary is the successor of its medieval Royal 
Hungary. This goes to show the current government is very concerned with the perceived 
identity of the country and its people, and is wary of it blending with other identities. 
After the elections in the spring of 2014, the national parliament consisted of 117 
members from the Fidesz party, which created a coalition with the Christian Democratic 
People’s party, and 23 members of the Jobbik party. Fidesz, the ruling party of Viktor 
Orban, is Eurosceptic, however its rhetoric does not call for an exit from the EU, but often 
criticizes the course and policy of the Union. In 2014, Orban publicly rejected liberal 
democracy and expressed his approval of models of government in Russia, Turkey and 
Singapore, focusing on tradition, patriotism, morality, religion and family, which 
immediately provoked a wave of disapproval from the EU and the West in general (New 
York Times, 2014). Moreover, in domestic policy, the ruling coalition implements the 
course of economic nationalism, limiting the activities of transnational corporations and 
banks, as well as promoting state control in the sphere of public services. In May 2014, 
during a visit to Berlin Orban announced the main principles of the country’s policy: the 
absence of immigration from countries alien to Christian values and culture, preservation 
of national identity and the traditional family unit, called upon the financial responsibility 
of the countries of the European community (The Budapest Beacon, 2014).  
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The clash of the Hungarian ruling coalition with the EU unfolded around 
principally fundamental issues. In his address to the European Parliament in April 2017, 
Orban said that Hungary’s membership in the EU is unconditional, but “in many respects 
[Hungarians] are not satisfied with how the EU works” and that he disagrees with the EU 
policy on a number of issues (EUInside, 2017). Orban confirmed that he prefers a Union 
of strong countries (instead of a federation of sorts), in which they themselves are 
responsible for national debt, the budget and border protection. Referring to the migration 
issue, the prime minister spoke in favor of national sovereignty and explained that 
Hungarians have the right to decide with whom they want to live. He also defended 
Christian values, which is why he was later criticized by the liberal members of the 
European Parliament. In turn Orban has received support from a group of Eurosceptics in 
the European Parliament, headed by the Polish member of parliament Zdislav 
Krasnodenskiy. 
In 2014 during a visit to the University of Baile Tusnad, Victor Orban gave an 
encompassing speech regarding the position of a state in the modern system of 
international relations. He mentioned the desire of Hungary to move away from the 
European model of liberal democracy and democratic standards. Orban, while criticizing 
the liberal model of government, said that the liberal system is not based on the ideas of 
justice, but on the ideas of promoting the interests of the most powerful and richest 
societal groups, while ignoring the interests of the national community (the Hungarian 
people), which are not as strong economically (Hungarian Government, 2014). Orban 
stated that there is a way to be democratic, but not liberal, while maintaining traditional 
Christian values and respect for the people, and at the same time being compatible with 
being a EU member state. 
Another point he made was about the links that Hungary can and cannot have with 
actors being present in other countries. He expressed that non-governmental 
organizations should not be financed from outside of the country, but receive funding 
from domestic sources. The reason being that hostile actors could use NGOs as a method 
to exercise their influence on Hungarian domestic politics, which would undermine the 
sovereignty of the country. Orban pointed out that such foreign influencers must be 
identified. Nevertheless, he thanked the Hungarians living abroad for voting for Fidesz, 
and said that the victory in the recent parliamentary election would not be possible 
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without them. He also mentioned Russia, Turkey and other states as examples of systems 
that are successful while being partial democracies or not being democracies at all. The 
statements outlined above provoked a negative reaction from the European Union, as they 
were putting European values into question. 
In 2015, in lieu of the refugee crisis and the influx of people the Middle East to 
the EU, the government of Hungary announced the construction of a 175-kilometer 
barrier along the southern border with Serbia (The Telegraph, 2015). Border barriers were 
also built along sections of Croatian, Slovenian, Romanian border lines. Those barriers 
significantly reduced the numbers of refugees that successfully entered the Hungarian 
state. This practice is not officially prohibited by the European Union, while several of 
the states which are divided by such barriers are member states of the EU and a part of 
the Schengen zone, which implies freedom of movement between countries. However, 
the European Commissioner for trade affairs Cecilia Malmström, made a statement that 
“...any attempt to build walls or fences between member states is not the Europe that we 
want” (NTV, 2015). The ministers of the interior of the EU member states approved a 
plan for the redistribution of refugees in some EU countries, which included Hungary. 
However, Hungary voted against the resettlement of refugees among its territory.  
At the beginning of 2016 Orban announced that the Hungarian parliament will 
hold a national referendum on the opinion about the EU quotas on the distribution of 
refugees. He expressed his opinion in a rather protectionist way “...the adoption of such 
quotas will change the Hungarian and European national, cultural, religious identity, the 
EU institutions have no right to do so” (MNO.hu, 2016). The referendum in question was 
held later that year, initiated by the Fidesz and Jobbik parties. The question posed was 
“Do you want the European Union to be able to mandate the obligatory resettlement of 
non-Hungarian citizens into Hungary even without the approval of the National 
Assembly?”. Despite the fact that the majority of voters voted against the adoption of the 
quota on the resettlement of refugees in Hungary, the turnout for the referendum was 
43%, while 50% is the needed turnout for the referendum to be counted as valid 
(Fundamental Law of Hungary, 2016). According to the opposition parties, the reason for 
such low turnout is “passive resistance” to the political course of the current government 
of Eurosceptics (Kommersant, 2016). 
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One of the most recent markers of the worldview of the Hungarian leadership and 
the ruling party is the speech given by Victor Orban at the 27th Congress of Fidesz in 
November of 2017. This speech was given a year before the 2018 elections would take 
place and outlines the main aspects of the current viewpoints of Fidesz regarding various 
topics, including the Hungary’s current stance in European politics. One of the first things 
he mentions in relation to the aims of Fidesz for the future: “to strengthen, to deepen, and 
to defend Hungary” (Orban, 2017), while taking note of things that were already done. 
The speaker clarifies that the foundations of intellectual and spiritual beliefs of 
Hungarians must be deepened. This signifies consistent and strong support for upholding 
of traditional values. Strengthening is seen as an improvement to the national economy, 
repayment of loans to the International Monetary Fund and the EU – “We put an end to 
the financial guardianship we were under…” (Orban, 2017), and taking under Hungarian 
ownership sizable amounts of banking, energy and media sectors. As the speech is given 
in wake of coming elections, a substantial part of it is devoted to economics in general 
and the well-being of Hungarian people. 
Among the accents that Orban places in different parts of the speech, the 
deepening of intellectual and spiritual foundations plays a major role. Those foundations 
are seen by the speaker as a sort of compass that should guide the Hungarian society in 
its movement forward. Orban makes sure to point out that he distinguishes preservation 
of traditional values and “…being romantic heroes riding out to fight against the spirit of 
the age” (Orban, 2017). He sees values that are imposed by the “globalist elites” as 
artificial, while being in tune with the spirit of the age is maintaining a traditional outlook 
is deemed better suited for current times. Traditional values are understood as being hard-
working, honest and Christian. Orban is convinced that he success of Hungary depends 
on the quality of intellectual foundations of intellectual beliefs. Those foundations are 
perceived to be national in nature “and have always been centered on the survival, task 
and mission of the Hungarian nation” (Orban, 2017). He points out that he sees interstate 
cooperation as a national affair, contrary to one of class or ancestry. The justification 
follows later in the speech as Orban proclaims that the most important bond (beyond the 
biological laws) between humans is one of “nation”, which allows for easier 
communication between people. A world with no clear dividing points of reference is 
confusing and leads to harmful results, Orban states. 
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 It should be noted that Orban does not specifically define who the globalist elites 
are in this speech, only mentioning George Soros while mentioning “Soros-type 
networks” that promote specific interests. However later into the speech it is stated that 
those elites are still ruling Europe. He is of the opinion that the elites are using the 
populism brand as a derogatory term used to discredit those who are supporting traditional 
values, meaning something that is “…national, popular, Christian and civic” (Orban, 
2017). A point that is brought up next is one about identity, on how having one is 
important in modern times and that the close future of the European continent is hinging 
on how identities are structured and formed. Orban points out that in today’s Europe some 
countries have started abandoning Christianity as a value system and nation as a concept. 
Some countries have retained Christianity, and Orban poses a question about how a truly 
united Europe can be a result of such crossing paths. According to him the answer is to 
accept each other’s differences and cease the imposition of values and ways of thinking 
which is currently being done. In consistency with speeches given earlier, Orban 
condemns NGOs with foreign funding as carrying out harmful influencing campaigns in 
Hungary and across Europe overall, and compares them to Soviet propagandists. Security 
concerns are mentioned as a result of the current migration politics of the European 
Union, the rising frequency of terrorist acts across Europe and crime rates. Orban draws 
a direct comparison between the efforts that the Soviet Union undertook towards Hungary 
to the actions are done by the “Soros empire” currently, stating that Hungary will not 
tolerate those things and will resist the implementation of the “Soros plan”. The last few 
paragraphs of the speech are devoted to the explanation of how the party came to life, the 
ups and down that were present during the time of its existence and the successes that 
were made possible due to the support of the Hungarian people. 
The most recent parliamentary election, which took place on April 8th, 2018 were 
a victory for Fidesz. The party did not gain any seats, retaining the previously held amount 
– 133, as an alliance with Christian Democratic People’s Party, forming a coalition 
formerly known as “Alliance of Hungarian Solidarity” (Der Spiegel, 2018). The platform 
with which Fidesz ran this election was fairly consistent with the viewpoints propagated 
by the party leadership through the years, preserving conservative and right-wing views 
such as support for Christian values, anti-immigration outlook and opposition to foreign 
interference as they understand it. Following the election there were protests occurring in 
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the country’s capital, Budapest. There was a large demonstration, up to 100,000 people 
showed up, denouncing the “theft” of the election by the winner, support of the EU and 
desire for having a genuine democratic system with actual checks and balances in the 
country (BBC, 2018). Different opposition movements were involved in the protest, 
including the right-wing nationalist party Jobbik. The Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) criticized the general election procedure, citing usage of 
administrative government resources by Fidesz, often impolite campaigning rhetoric and 
the “undermining contestants’ ability to compete on an equal basis” (The Guardian, 
2018).  
This chapter’s goal is to outline the main tenets of the Eurosceptic stance that is 
employed by the current Hungarian leadership. It is evident that through the years of 
Fidesz being in power the main talking points and positions were consistent: respect for 
national sovereignty, denunciation of supranationalism, support of set identity and 
traditional values. The facts showcased in this chapter will be used in the following 
chapter during the analysis using the typology by Vasilopoulou and the modern/post-
modern theoretical framework. 
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6. Theoretical and comparative perspectives 
Opposition to federal Europe (as a vision of Europe as one entity encompassing 
different states) is evident in the social and political life of several new members (post 
socialist) of the European Union. Euroscepticism is common thing among them, although 
its prerequisites are largely different than in Western Europe. The enthusiasm for a new 
European future in these countries has now noticeably quieted down, and there is 
pessimism and apathy among parts of the population of the countries of that area. This 
may come as a surprise, especially if we recall that, since the end of the cold war, EU 
membership has become a strategic goal for these states, hoping that it can help them 
overcome a clear economic and social gap with Western countries. 
In the countries that have become new members of the European Union, the 
transition to capitalism and the post-industrial economy, as well as democratic transit and 
accession to the EU coincided in time. Therefore, their political development was facing 
serious difficulties. Some of these countries have managed to maintain a balance by 
creating a big government as a way to protect the interests of some segments of the 
population in a transitional society. Others went the other way with actual democratic 
transition. Both of them perceive EU membership as a means of protecting national 
interests. However, the very concept of national interest is currently placed under focus 
of some Eurosceptic states. Sometimes, Euroscepticism in the economy, politics and 
culture of these countries takes the form of protection of national interest in some areas 
from the “influence” of the EU institutions. These processes are present in the Visegrad 
countries – Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. As mentioned above 
Hungary and Poland are the focus of this thesis. They were selected as the main countries 
in the EU that demonstrate what Euroscepticism means currently for the members of the 
Union. There are other Eurosceptic countries such as the UK and Austria, but they are 
different to the ones selected for this thesis due to a number of factors. For example: the 
UK is currently in the process of leaving the Union, while the Austrian right-wing 
government came to be quite more recently than the ones that are analyzed in the course 
of this research. 
The comparison according to Vasilopoulou typology allows to compare and 
contrast real life observations to the theoretical framework. According the typology the 
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case studies are analyzed through a set of factors which explain the case studies’ attitude 
towards European integration, which are: the definition, principle, practice and future of 
integration. Depending on how those factors are distributed by two possible values - “in 
favor” or “against”, the three types of Euroscepticism are formed: rejecting, conditional 
or compromising. 
6.1 The definition 
The attitude towards the definition of European integration is the most basic factor 
which allows for a single analysis of multiple subjects, if they all agree on what the 
process of integration is supposed to mean. In Vasilopoulou’s typology all three types 
Eurosceptics are listed as in favor of the definition of European states and peoples as 
having different bonds between each other, which are a consequence to a long and rich 
history of living on the same continent together. All three types of Eurosceptics being in 
favor of the definition mean that they share the same concept and plan their actions 
accordingly.  
As it is evident from factual observations, both Poland and Hungary both see 
Europe in general as a continent with great historic importance and as heir to ancient 
civilizations and countries emerging from them. Both PiS and Fidesz are consistent in 
their rhetoric when talking about Europe – they see it as something great that must be 
preserved. They have their own vision on how is should be preserved but their opinion 
on the past is similar – they see it as something to learn from. The importance of Christian 
values, national unity and other traditions indicate the favorable outlook that the analyzed 
countries have on the customs to which they see themselves as inheritors. Orban in his 
2017 address to the party called Europe “…our wider motherland…”, while Law and 
Justice sees Europe in positive light, as a place of freedom, equality and common rights. 
This allows to draw the conclusion that both countries are in favor of the definition of 
European integration that Vasilopoulou outlines in the typology used for this analysis. 
Them being in favor means that they agree that by definition Europe in general and the 
EU in particular should cooperate and actors should base their interactions on peaceful 
and mutually beneficial policies. 
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6.2 The principle 
The principle of European integration is defined as the willingness to cooperate 
on the European level. Vasilopoulou’s typology allows the subject of analysis to be 
critical of the framework of the European Union under which such multilateral 
cooperation takes place. So, if an actor that is an active critic and a supporter of reforms 
in the EU, but is nevertheless ready to constructively communicate and deliver its 
positions though the channels that already exists – that actor would be considered as in 
favor of the principle of European integration. Opposition to the principle means “not 
only the government and its policies but also the whole system of governance” 
(Vasilopoulou, 2011: 230). 
The leadership of Poland and Hungary is on record stating that they indeed want 
to see the European Union as something different from now. They are of the opinion that 
changes are necessary in order for the EU to survive the current crisis that it is a victim 
to. Both PiS and Fidesz are eager to mention national interests of their own countries as 
the main driving forces of their politics, both internal and domestic. They see states 
pursuing their national interests as a model that can be emulated by other states and that 
method of action would lead to a stronger Europe that is supposed to stand the test of 
time. In the manifesto that PiS prepared for the 2015 European Parliament election the 
party states that they see the EU as a “Union of common sense, a Union that believes in 
the strength and activity of natural communities – from families to European nations and 
states” (Gagatek, 2014: 309). Victor Orban called for reform in the EU numerous times, 
in regard to different policies, however he and the Fidesz have always tried to have a 
constructive conversation regarding the proposed changes of the Union. Both analyzed 
subjects are not in favor of leaving the EU, they both see that the Union needs changes to 
survive, but they are not opposed to the whole system of communication that exists 
between them and the EU bodies and are ready to continue delivering their viewpoints 
and proposed vision through it. Thus, both subjects’ attitude towards the principle of 
European integration can be classified as in favor. 
6.3 The practice 
Vasilopoulou defines the practice of European integration as the EU institutional 
and policy status quo. The way of administering EU law and framework of supranational 
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institutions as well as the overall nature and reasoning of decision-making on the EU level 
are also included in the definition. Being in opposition to the practice of EU integration 
means being opposed to the way the policy decisions are made in the Union currently. 
Taking a look at the positions of both countries by analyzing the speech acts of 
their leaders in different contexts it seems like their positions are similar, at least in 
declared intent. Both Polish and Hungarian governments with their ruling parties are 
taking part in the institutional framework that exists currently in the EU, while not 
expressing explicit desires to demolish it at this time. Their major quals stem from the 
apparent long-term unsustainability of such a model of decision-making. They want to 
see it as something different in the future, but the future is another aspect of this typology. 
The definition of support of practice of European integration can be considered somewhat 
vague is the subject matter of analysis includes not only intent, but actions as well. 
Vasilopoulou mainly talks about party positions in the classification. By analyzing party 
(or, in this case, positions of parties which have the main decision-making powers in both 
case studies) positions it can be derived that both PiS and Fidesz express a discontempt 
of some ways in which the policy making process of the EU is carried out. As Orban 
mentions in the 2017 speech at the Fidesz congress event, he sees Europe as a platitude 
of different nation-states, with no center which would have the ability to dictate a common 
course of development for all, as it is presumably doing currently. The PiS party, 
according to the programme of 2014 European Parliament elections, also states in the 
manifesto that the ideal Union that they see and what they striving to is “A Union having 
many regional centres, not divided into one centre of decision-making in the euro zone 
and a dependent periphery” (Gagatek, 2014: 309). Also in the manifesto it is stated that 
the EU should not have a “hierarchy” of states meaning that some states should not have 
more lobbying power than others. PiS sees the true potential of democracy in the EU “… 
only when it is organised in the Member States, as the real citizen community exists only 
within countries, the rest is utopia and fantasy” (Gagatek, 2014: 309). This shows a strong 
desire to restore sovereignty and democratic institutions in the modern sense, as opposed 
to the post-modern structure of the EU. Both Fidesz and PiS see a necessity in changes 
regarding the way that EU should go forward, however, while their declared Eurosceptic 
statements are similar their actions during the recent years show different levels of 
commitment and desire to push back. 
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When the migrant crisis of the EU entered its more intense phase in 2015 different 
member states responded differently. That migrant crisis can be considered the main 
culprit in the analysis of the case studies, as it exacerbates their stances on one side, and 
it is possible to trace their ways of implementing counter measures on the other. 2015 
brought an increase of refugees and migrants in the EU considerably compared to the 
numbers of previous years. Most arrivals were made through the Mediterranean Sea by 
boats of different size and cargo capacity, some of which were not intended to transport 
people as a main means of use, which lead to accidents in the sea and subsequent deaths 
of passengers. The main routes that the migrants took were through Europe’s southern 
member states – Spain, Italy, and most of the Balkans. The Balkan states (not all of which 
are members of the EU) and Italy experienced the largess numbers of people trying to 
enter the EU with the intention of asking for asylum (BBC, 2015). In 2015 Most of them 
tried to gain asylum in Germany, a sizable number asked for asylum in Hungary, while a 
comparatively small number aimed to do so in Poland (Eurostat, 2015). Both Polish (after 
PiS won the parliamentary election closer to the end of 2015) and Hungarian leadership 
expressed concern over the refugee situation that was unfolding at the time in the Union, 
as it was detrimental to Europe as a whole in their opinion. However, Hungary went a 
step further and decided to implement actual measures to counter the flow of migrants 
that went through the borders of the country. As mentioned earlier, those measures 
materialized in the construction of border barriers between Hungary and several different 
neighboring states. The EU officials expressed concern while noting that is the member 
states’ responsibility to control their borders however the EU encouraged the usage of 
alternative measures to reach the stated goals (Radio Free Europe, 2015). Those barriers, 
which are still in place to this day, were used to redirect refugees from entering Hungary 
to send them to other state, such as Slovenia, Austria and others. A year later, in 2016 
Hungary even declared a state of emergency which lasted for two years, complimented 
with reinforcement of the borders with troops in order to provide maximum possible 
security and filtering capacity (Hungary Today, 2016). 
Polish efforts in expressing the discontempt with the migrant crisis handling by 
the EU are comparable to those of Hungary in spirit, but turn out to be different in 
practical measures. As Poland is not in high ranking position judging by the number of 
asylum applications (compared to Hungary) the Polish leadership may have the freedom 
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to adopt more of a softer stance than Hungary. Both Hungary and Poland expressed the 
notion of compulsory migrant quotas stemming from the EU, as being unwary of national 
interests of member states (Bloomberg, 2015). The Visegrad Group as a whole jointly 
declared that they disapprove of long term refugee quotas, which led to subsequent launch 
of sanction procedures by the EU several years later (Euractiv, 2017). Through the years 
of Hungary and Poland made similar remarks in relation to the ongoing refugee crisis, 
however the construction of border barriers puts Hungary on a different level comparted 
to Poland in its protest against the approach of the European Union. Polish leadership is 
on record saying that the country will only accept refugees only “… if we have security 
guarantees” (Reuters, 2015), however Poland did not modify its borders in any way in 
order to keep them away or filter them extensively. Judging by the geographical positions 
of Hungary and Poland and considering the routes that the refugees are taking to reach 
Europe it can be derived that Hungary is in a more “exposed” state than Poland finds itself 
in. As well as bordering several Balkan states Hungary also borders a country which is 
not a member of the EU, through which migrants also try to reach deeper inland. Due to 
this Hungary has more of a chance to encounter refugees and register them according to 
EU laws. The inability to register and process large amounts of people was one of the 
main reasons for the construction of border barriers, which were mentioned earlier. Victor 
Orban stated in 2015 that the refugees that were coming through Hungary were a 
“German problem”, not Hungarian, since most of them wanted to seek asylum there 
(BBC, 2015). Compared to Hungary Poland does not have the responsibility to process 
such a large number of migrants, in addition to not having social programs comparable 
to Germany’s and other member states which make the country not as desirable to seek 
asylum in. So, Poland has a geographical advantage as well as a political advantage which 
allow the country’s leadership to be more flexible in the actions that they take in relation 
to their stance on the refugee crisis and their Eurosceptic position overall. It should also 
be noted that the rhetoric that Polish and Hungarian leadership employ differs in 
harshness, especially recently. The recent PiS convention can shed some light on what 
the most concurrent view of the EU is employed by the party: the slogan under which it 
was held was “Poland Heart of Europe”, while the notion that Poland is in the heart of 
Europe was echoed though the convention (Daily Herald, 2018). This contrasts with the 
notion that Orban propagated in his 2017 speech where he talked about how the EU was 
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a part of a hostile globalist agenda. Another important marker for Poland confirming with 
the EU is the reversal of the judicial reform that was under EU scrutiny for a year, and 
drew serious media attention as it caused concerns regarding the independence of the 
judicial branch of government (Deutsche Welle, 2018). 
If the Vasilopoulou factor classification was to be followed literally (in relation to 
the practice of European integration), as in taking into account mainly the declared 
stances propagated by the countries, then both of the case studies would be classified as 
in favor. If actions were also to be considered, then Hungary would more likely to be 
considered against. 
6.4 The future 
The factor of support for the future of European integration indicates support for 
further cooperation with EU bodies and development of shared competences. The key 
here is that the support means development of European integration under the umbrella 
of EU institutions and further development of their decision making abilities. Opposition 
to this factor means rejection of the current course of the EU and further convergence of 
different actors within the Union. 
As it was evident from the relevant chapters of the analysis, both PiS and Fidesz 
share a negative view of the future of Europe under its current course. They still see the 
European Union existing, they want to remain its members, but they want to change the 
policy making process going forward. In the speeches of Victor Orban, the party programs 
and manifestos of Law and Justice one pattern is similar and clear – the desire for more 
self sufficiency and respect for sovereignty among member states. Examples include the 
course to restore national control over big businesses which was taken by Victor Orban 
and his party, and the express unwillingness of the Polish leadership to have its budget 
controlled by the EU. Both of the case studies may employ different ways of pushing 
back, but one thing that they definitely have in common is the negative outlook on the 
future of the EU if it’s not reformed according to their views. That means more 
sovereignty, less competences given the EU institutions, less regulations in the economic 
sphere, more unilaterality in relationships with other member states as well as non-
members of the EU and, finally, more respect towards the unique values of their 
respective countries and other member states as well. Vasilopoulou in the typology lists 
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all ideal types as being against the support of future EU integration. Both case studies 
seem to adhere to the classification in the sense of their outlook on the future on 
integration and Europe as a whole. 
The analysis can be summarized in the table below. As noted earlier, depending 
on the interpretation of the definition of the practice factor, the corresponding type of 
Euroscepticism can change for Hungary – it is either compromising or conditional, while 
for Poland it is compromising without changes. 
Factors Poland (PiS)  Hungary (Fidesz)  
Definition In favor In favor 
Principle of European 
integration/cooperation 
In favor In favor 
Practice of European 
integration/cooperation 
In favor In favor/Against 
Future of European 
integration/cooperation 
Against Against  
Table 2: results of the analysis according to the typology 
 As for the modern vs. post-modern contrariety that was outlined it the respective 
literature review section, it is evident that both Hungary and Poland can reasonably fit 
into the categories that Cooper and Sorensen outlined in their respective frameworks. 
According to the claims of both PiS and Fidesz sovereignty and respect for national 
interests is central for them, while for the EU national interests are secondary to the 
interests of the whole community of states, while some competences are meant to be 
shared with supranational institutions. Identity and perseverance of historic and 
traditional values is also one of the main points in the programs which can be consistently 
traced through the majority of both parties’ existence and being in power. The EU, being 
a post-modern system and due the nature of its policy making processes and the process 
of integration makes it easy for identities to blend which is undesirable for actors who are 
on the modern side. More bilateralism is desired by the analyzed actors while the EU 
stands for inclusivity of different actors in the international relations process, including 
institutions which are supposed to oversee and advise on the different interactions that 
may occur. 
What the frameworks applied to the real situation demonstrate is that there is a 
clash between different world views occurring. Both Poland and Hungary which are 
currently modern actors and view the surroundings through a modern paradigm find 
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themselves in a post-modern system, which is the EU. Most existing European integration 
theories imply that enlargement and the integration in different areas leads to further 
strengthening of ties and identities (Webber, 2014). And indeed, it is expected that new 
member states ascend to the EU in good faith, with a course to further integration after 
ascension. Webber argues that this optimistic approach has its drawbacks and things it 
overlooks. Examples include the lacking attention to domestic political processes brewing 
in member states, and the share of the overall support of the whole integration process by 
Germany, which is deemed to be the most advanced and powerful state of the region. Per 
Webber, the theories of integration that he analyzed allowed for the disintegration of the 
with varying degrees of probability, but most of them viewed it as a distant occurrence. 
Cooper and Sorensen outlined the differences in how reality is perceived and what is most 
important to the characteristics of the modern vs. post-modern worlds, however the 
possibility of an actor turning into a modern position in a post-modern system was not 
provided in sufficient detail. The clash that occurs in the EU currently is a demonstration 
of that process which is still ongoing and can be a challenge to the development of further 
European integration. 
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7. Conclusion 
The Euroscepticism notion among the member states of the Union has become a 
more prevalent phenomenon with the passage of time. Parties in countries with generally 
positive outlooks on the process of European integration started seeing traction in the 
appearance of different movements which were not so enthusiastic about the course in 
which the EU was head in their opinion. The refugee crisis which appeared as a result of 
instability in the Middle East proved to be a trigger to the rising popularity of such 
movements in some countries of the Union. It is possible to generally describe their 
positions as Eurosceptic, however a more detailed analysis is required to get the full 
picture and motivation of those groups and parties. 
The aim of this Master’s thesis was to shed light on the possible differences by 
analyzing select case studies: the political parties Fidesz and Law and Justice of Hungary 
and Poland respectively, as two clear representatives of Eurosceptic states which have 
Eurosceptic parties in power and are currently members of the European Union. The 
empirical analysis which was done during the course of two respective chapters aimed to 
provide most possible detail in relation to the task at hand. Some parts of the analysis 
would be better off if the author of the thesis knew the languages that are used in the 
respective countries: it would be possible to compare the party programme of PiS in the 
2014 European Parliament elections with a similar one of Fidesz, or a more detailed 
account of the recent congress of the PiS party would be presented, as of this time there 
is no available translations to the languages that the author knows. While there are 
different typologies existing, which aim to set barriers between different types of 
Euroscepticism, the one developed by Vasilopoulou proved to be the most contemporary 
and taking into consideration the drawbacks of previous theories. The theoretical part of 
the thesis is the dichotomies of modern and post-modern worlds, developed by Cooper 
and Sorensen. Those two authors constructed similar frameworks which aim to explain 
the differences in values and worldview of actors belonging in different “worlds”. With 
those two components in mind, as well as a critical approach to their applicability, an 
overview of the Eurosceptic tendencies of the selected case studies was presented. 
Analysis shows that those two frameworks can be applied to the study at hand and 
conclusions can be drawn, but not without caveats.  
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Those drawbacks stem from the unique positions that the case studies find 
themselves in in relation to the frameworks. The two analyzed countries are essentially 
modern actors which find themselves in a post-modern system. The framework proved 
suitable to the task at hand, as the empirical findings mostly fit into the presented 
categories and explain the inherent differences between the case studies and the post-
modern system they find themselves in. The literature on the dichotomy of modern vs. 
post-modern models views the them as different steps of the same ladder, in the sense 
that actors go through the modern stage and then proceed to the post-modern stage, which 
is expected to be more lucrative and thus the states are expected to stay there. What this 
thesis shows is that there exists a situation where the post-modern system (which is the 
EU) where modern actors can appear. The literature briefly touches that states can go 
back to the pre-modern world from the modern version, however, is not explicit in 
outlining what to expect when a modern actor finds itself in a post-modern system. The 
Vasilopoulou typology proved to be an applicable tool in the analysis of different 
Eurosceptic behaviors, however the main drawback of the typology lies in the factor of 
relationship to the practice of European integration. The author of the Typology is mostly 
concerned with the stances that the analyzed subjects take, but their actions should also 
be considered in order for accurate assessment. That leads to the problem with the factor 
of practice of European integration, depending on the interpretation of that factor, the 
answer to the research question according to the typology changes: its’ whether both of 
the case studies are considered compromising Eurosceptics, or Hungary is conditional 
while Poland is compromising. 
The contribution of this thesis has been in finding out the differences in 
Eurosceptic tendencies of the analyzed case studies, while using a critical approach to the 
used frameworks. The two theoretical and comparative components were used in order to 
demonstrate their differences, however it was shown that they do not capture the full 
picture needed for complete analysis. The implications for theory are the following: the 
theoretical thought on typologies of Euroscepticism should move into the direction of 
more of a practical classification, as there are currently more Eurosceptic movements 
compared to the times when the existing typologies were developed. As for the theory on 
modern and post-modern systems the thought should go in the direction of developing of 
some sort of clause where modern actors are discussed as part of a post-modern system, 
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and the modernist blowback that happens in practice and its possible ramifications for the 
process of integration as a whole. 
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